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Apart from its  historical roots, and being the bed of the  Persian civilization,  
Iran has  acquired more and  more importance after the Islamic  invasion 
because merging its  original historical power with the  Islamic Civilization. 
Adopting the SHIA doctrine was  also a  symbol  and  a manifestation of  
differentiation of  Iran concerning its  view  and  perspective  towards  the 
Islamic religion. Driven  by a continuous  controversial relationship with the  
Arab  World, this trend  was  conducive to orient the Iranian foreign policy  
in  accordance  with that controversy but  also in  balance  with its interests 
with  the superpowers of the time, especially USA and USSR in the Cold War 
Era.  At  the forefront of the non-aligned countries,  Iran  have  had always 
envisioned the necessity to  balance its respective relationship with  those 
two powers without  neglecting the  eventual  contribution  of other western 
developed  countries (like  France and  Germany ) which  could  be  of big  
help in  achieving its main goal of being treated as  a regional superpower in 
the  Middle- East. Without neglecting the help  of  some emerging  or 
developing  countries  who  provided great support to  Iran in  acquiring the 
nuclear technology.  
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This objective has  been determined as a  key orientation from the Shah  
Mohamed  Reza Era who  was  enjoying  strong relationships  with the USA , 
but  followed up  and emphasized during the Islamic Republic era, especially  
under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rule. Conscious of the importance of this 
country  and  its strategical position both in the World  and the Middle-East,  
as well as of the whole World,  and its  richness in matter of  energetical 
resources and  its proximity to  Afghanistan which has  been  at the forefront 
of the confrontation between USA  and  USSR during the last century, the  
Iranian nuclear problem  has  always been  at the  center of the interest of 
the main powers , especially  as a  potential rival of Israel,  the unique 
detainer of nuclear capabilities in the region of the  Middle-East and  the first 
partner of the USA  in the region  conjugated with the Gulf Arab countries, 
natural  enemy of Iran. 
 Even having  complied with the IAEA  recommendations, and  its  allegations 
that its  nuclear facilities  aim only pacific  applications,  Iran  has  never been 
trusted on this point  by the great powers. Nevertheless, the Neorealist 
theory is  susceptible to explain the position of  each  stakeholder in this  
issue because  every  party  should  defend  its own interests and every single 
position could be explain by this theory and by the security dilemma posed 
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by this issue of nuclear proliferation in a sulfurous region as the middle East. 
The aim of this study stands on two main pillars: explaining the its 
motivations and justifications of  each party,  the US as well as  the  Russian 
position on  the Iranian Nuclear programme  and finally the basis of 
difference of views between those two superpowers on this nuclear 
programme seen under  the prism of each counterpart’s considerations. 
 In general, the respective positions  of the USA  and  Russia towards the 
Iranian  nuclear programme have been shaped by their respective  security 
and  nuclear policies   as  well as their interests in the region of the Middle-
East  and  the changing  of their respective relations  with Iran as  well  as 
their bilateral  relations.   In  fact,   the  United States has  changed radically 
its position  from  a  sustainor and contributor to the Iranian  Nuclear 
programme with the raising of the Islamic  Republic  because it  considers 
with a  lot of doubt and  insecurity this programme ,  which threatens  its 
hegemony in the region   and targets  principally its  main partner in the  
region  Israel,  as  well as it  considers it as a  potential enhancer of terrorist 
islamist movements. While Russia shares the  concern of the possibility that 
Iran  could  use  its  nuclear programme to  acquire nuclear weapons , it  
doesn’t  feel so  much threatened by this  programme and  prefers 
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considering Iran as a  commercial partner in the region of the Middle- East 
and a potential  client for its  know-how  and  nuclear material,  especially  
after the  USSR’s   dismantlement and in  any case is convinced by the 
complete  compliance of Iran to the International framework, especially the 
IAEA safeguards and  this position is  more  and  more  confirmed  for  Russia  
after the  signature of the Nuclear deal  between the  P5+1  countries and 
Iran  
Key words : Nuclear Proliferation, Neorealism, Iran history and  nuclear 
programme, US Iranian relationship, US Russian relationship, proliferation 
policy from the American point of view, proliferation policy from the Russian 













Chapter I- Introduction: 
 
Iran  has declared its  nuclear ambitions  since the second half of the   last 
century. Many countries   sustained her  while many others were opposed 
to those ambitions. It has been the object of many controversies. Among 
the  countries which were interested in this  conflict,  all the countries in the 
Middle-East , especially Arab countries  and Israel  as well as  the USA and 
Russia, especially in the period  of the Cold War based on ideological 
opposition and competition  to  attract more  countries in their respective 
trajectories. This competition lead to a polarization of many countries   and   
as  consequence, the Iranian nuclear acquired more  and  more importance 
and is  now a  very  sensitive issue susceptible to destabilize all the region of 
the Middle East and could be  conducive   to  a third World  War. Because 
of its dangers, nowadays, this protracted crisis has increased tensions in the 
region and beyond , including Iran itself, the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, 
Russia, the UK  and the US), the gulf countries (especially Saudi Arabia ) and 
most importantly Israel especially after the  withdrawal of the United States 
from the JPCOA agreement  which is  susceptible to destabilize the region 
especially in  a conflictual security  context harmed  with non-nuclear issues 
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concern like the situation in  Israel-Palestine and the ongoing wars in  Yemen 
and  Syria, That’s  why the role of USA and Russia combined with multilateral 
institutions would be very crucial in  solving those problems. 
 
1 – Research Questions:   
 Iran has   shown a  rising interest for nuclear technology  since  the  shah 
Era ,  even if the nuclear  age in the history of the  humanity refers back to 
before the  second  World  War,  but the recent tensions  which  appeared 
between Iran  and  Israel in the Middle-East in 2012 have put  the  classical 
strategy debate over the nuclear issues. In fact, the  controversy over 
Weapons of Mass Destruction is based on two  antagonist theories ( MAD) : 
Mutual Assured Destruction  and  NUTS (Nuclear Utilization and Target 
Selection)1.  The first approach to  Nuclear strategy (MAD) is  at the  base of 
the principle  of deterrence  and  defense. According to MAD reasoning, the 
only result to  expect from the  use  of nuclear weapons is annihilation. It 
means  that  everything  would  be  destructed,  therefore the basis use Of 
WMD is deterrence only. Any trespassing of this  step  would lead to  a  
                                                            
1 http://sites.psu.eduMaria  Cosma. MAD and Nuts  about Nuclear Weapons- The Centrist 
Party-06/12/2012 
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complete and irreversible  situation of destruction. Conclusion: WMD and 
Nuclear weapons, especially should  never be  used. The final expected result 
of building nuclear facilities  would be the end  of Total War like  we  have 
noticed  between the occidental  countries since the  end of WWII in 1945, 
and especially the blunt end of war with the  atomic  bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki by the Americans. 
The second  approach to  Nuclear Strategy, NUTS, claims  the possibility to  
win war by targeting the  nuclear arsenal of the adversary and as  a result to  
end  war  with the prevision in this  case  of  second-strike capabilities well 
hidden as   an  advantage  but also very difficult to  deploy as a  notable 
shortcoming.  In both approaches,  the  Security Dilemma  concept driven  
by  a  mistrust between opponent  forces will incite some  countries  to  
acquire  more nuclear weapons,  while others who don’t have previously  
would  do  efforts  to acquire those facilities . This  arms  race  would  follow  
an ascendant  trajectory  according to five mains steps; 
Here are the steps to nuclear acquisition: 
1. No program 
2. Program for energy only 
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3. Weapons research/nuclear fuel program 
4. Weapons acquisition (opaque) 
5. Test weapon2’ 
At this  stage, Iran is  considered at the  3rd step  so in the  middle of 
the itinerary, but the problem is  that even Iran  is claiming the pacific  
nature of its nuclear programme  and  alleging   complete  compliance 
with international standards  and  transparency towards IAEA 
inspections,  the rest of the  World, especially  Israel,  the  surrounding 
Arab Gulf  countries and  the occident in general remain skeptical 
towards those  allegations  and fear the non-efficiency of the MAD 
approach initially aimed  for deterrence and  prevention of war goes  
far beyond  what expected and is  conducive at the  final  step to  a 
third  World  war or  other overreacting consequences.    
 The problem initiates from  a  difference of  vision between the three 
countries on the nuclear proliferation, USA,  Russia  and  Iran. As 
highlighted  in the literature review chapter, the Iranian need to 
developing a nuclear programme and enriching  Uranium can be 
completely justified by its feeling of threat and by being surrounded 
                                                            
2 Ibid. 
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by many enemies in the region, all, especially Saudi Arabia, the 
Council of  Gulf Countries (CGC) AND  Israel are intimate partners 
with the USA, which explain the strong fear and  enmity that feels  
Iran against the USA. Moreover, its  nuclear proliferation policy, the 
USA is  incentived  by its strategic energetic  interests  in the Middle 
East and aims  to have   access to other trade and  war tactical 
trajectories through the Caspian  region and  with the former CIS 
countries to challenge the Russian domination on the region as  well 
as  an easiest road to China and  the Pacific region. And its second  
most important interest is to break the  military coalition existing 
between Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and  the 
Syrian government as  the USA consider all those  entities and  
movements as  main sustainers of terroristic  activity destabilizing the 
whole World. 
The main research  question concerning this  study is  how to explain and  
justify the  different views  of each power, namely Russia and  USA  to the 
Iranian Nuclear Programme Issue? 
To elaborate this  research  some important questions  should  be raised. 
First of  all we  need to know why  Iran need a  Nuclear Programme? Secondly 
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what are the  respective responses of  each country (USA , Russia) to those  
justification and   to  what  extent  and  in  which perspectives  do their views  
differ towards this crucial issue?  
Finally,  the  divergences between the  two visions should  be  explained  and  
justified by the  theoretical framework. 
 
2- Significance of the  Study:  
 The importance of the  study is  justified by the  strategic geographic 
position occupied  by Iran in the Centre of the  Asian continent and  the  
energetical resources its underground  contains like oil, and natural gas (2nd 
reserve in the World in matter of  Gas. Any  conflict  who  may occur in this 
region would  have  consequences on all the  World for being located in the 
Middle-East, Center of the  World and  near to the Holy places, namely 
Makkah and Madinah for Islamic religion and Jerusalem in Palestine (Israel) 
for the  three monotheist religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. It  is also 
crucial because  Iran is of Shi’i obedience,  which is  in conflict  with the  
majority of  Muslims which  are  Sunni and Iran is making all efforts to  sustain  
shiia in  any Muslim  country, like Iraq, Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon,  and  
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Alawi power in  Syria, those  last two who are virulent enemies  of Israel,  
main partner of the USA in the region, before the Gulf Arab States.  Iran  is  
also encouraging the  Shia minorities in all  of the  remaining states,  not only 
because of religious  affinities but  also  due to Iran considering itself as  a 
real regional power prone to  expansion according to the Safavid Imperialist 
Doctrine rooting back to its previous  history. Moreover,  Iran is partner of 
many occidental countries since the Shah Era,  and  those  countries dispute 
antagonist economic  and political interests in the region. At this point,  we  
should  not forget that Iran has been at the center of the Cold  WAR between 
the USA and the USSR and  is  still an object of  discord with the actual 
Russian federation. A neighbor country,  Afghanistan,  with a Sunni majority 
has  been  an object  of conflict at the  last  century  and it  is not still resolved. 
It was a starting point of the  emergence of International Terrorism which is  
still a topic of  actuality and  a  major threat to  all countries in the World  
and  especially USA and Russia,  even if the position on the terrorism 
expansion is  still controversial on the international  scene. And it is  clearly 
obvious that the  enrichment of fissile material  and  the enhancement of its  
nuclear facilities  in Iran is susceptible  to add  so more to the  danger and  
seriousness of the  threat in the region. 
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3- Organization of  chapters:  
 This  study would  be organized essentially in  four (04) main chapters. 
The  first chapter  : the Introduction  
1-The First   part of the introduction  would  be  dedicated to  state the  
question to  which  this  research  should answer. 
2-The Second   part will determine  the importance, interest and  
significance of this  study and  our motivation to tackle this issue and to  
which  extent shall the  recommendations  we could  provide a solution  to 
the  problems  in the region and  a catalyzing factor for reducing the 
probability of  occurrence of  extensive and  crisis induced by  a serious  
domino effect with projections   and  consequences in  all the region and in 
the World. 
3-The Third   part will determine the  organization of the Study  in  chapters . 
The Second Chapter will review the  main literature and  state of the  art of 




1- The literature specific  on the Iranian Nuclear programme itself. 
2- The literature specific on the  American position on the Iranian 
nuclear programme 
3- The literature concerning  the Russian position on the Iranian 
nuclear programme . 
 
 The third Chapter :Russia’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Program:   
1- Iran’s  background would  be  an introduction to the  topic which  will 
define  clearly the background  of the issue ,  acknowledge the  country  
and the region as  well as a  brief  abstract of the  history of the country  
and  its  relations with its  neighbors and of the powers of  the time. 
After that, an introduction to the topic  of international security would  
be performed with  all its aspects and then the discussion  would  be 
emphasized on the topic  on the nuclear proliferation in the  World and 
its importance  against and in the aim of  maintaining a global  security 
and  stability  as  well as the intensity of its  effect at the regional level.  
This  introduction would be  divided in  six main parts : namely. The 
background of the  study  and especially the background of  Iran  as  a  
country and  its main characteristics  in the  region  and  its relations  
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with the World  superpowers during the  Cold  War”: USSR   and  the 
United States. 
2-  Russia’s policy statements: would  give  some  examples of  statements 
determining the orientation of the Russian policy towards the  Iranian  
Nuclear Programme. 
3-  Analysis: This part would  be  an  analysis of the  results obtained from 
the  different  sources and   a tentative  to  give an  explanation to  the  
difference of  views  between the US and Russia towards the Iranian  
Nuclear Programme. 
The Fourth Chapter would  be dedicated to the main results extracted from 
this  study  and the main deductions as  well as  some recommendations  to 
give to the  actors and partners in this  crucial issue in order to reduce the 
opportunity  of deviance to an armed conflict. 
  Moreover, it  would be defining the conclusion  and  trying to  answer the  
questions  we have stated in the introduction and  will as well consist in 
opening the door to possibilities  for the  evolution of this  question in the 
future and   the possible scenario to  expect for the  consequences in the 
region and in the Whole World. 
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Chapter  II- Literature review: 
 The literature on the issue of Iran Nuclear Proliferation programme and  
the  various international position over this issue is very  abundant but 
among the various literature available, I’ve chosen some  works related to  
some  specific relevant issues like :  
1- Iran Nuclear Programme.: 
The book of N. Entessar and  K.L.  Afrasiabi on the period  of détente  since 
the beginning of negotiation of the nuclear deal between the P5+1   
countries and  Iran. The most important, this book try to discuss the  link  
between the requirements of a nuclear programme for Iran to  insure its 
National Security.  This  need is largely  explained  by the  fact that Iran is  
filling at threat  surrounded by many potential enemies. In fact, in 2014,  the 
Iranian Minister  of Foreign Affairs , Mohamed Jawad Zarif, declared that due 
to the maintenance  of its programme, Iran feels  more  secure and  that its 
program of  “ securitization cannot be  defeated anymore by the enemies of  
his  country”3. The Western  counterpart , by his side, judged that Iran has 
many shortcoming  and  weaknesses in its security strategy, therefore we  
                                                            
3 N. Entessar- Iran Nuclear Negotiations- Rowman  & Littlefield Editions- pp127-2015- USA-  
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can explain why “it is available to come to the negotiations table and that it  
was  the result of the  compellence policy exerted on Iran by the  economic 
sanctions. According to Iran, at the  contrary, it  was  more the  fear of the 
occident that pushed  it to the  negotiations  instead of the  Iranian  weakness. 
An other threat in fact was recognized by the  Iranian  counterpart : “ the oil 
economic insecurity”4 induced by the  oil trade war engaged  by the USA 
against Iran through Saudi Arabia proxy and  Iran  was  feeling like submitted 
to a  new economic warfare in parallel with the  sanctions, this situation 
conducted  Iran to devaluate its currency. From another perspective, the  US  
was said cooperating because feeling  constrained by the reinforcement of 
the  Iranian position and the raising  approving approaches of Russia and  
China. It is well clear that it was  needed a balancing  act that took into  
consideration Iran  national’s interest as  well as  the “ security dilemma” 
facing the western  countries against this  case. For example,  some  news  
reported that the US and  the Gulf Arab countries were cooperating on  a 
defense  shield against missiles’  threat from  Iran.  This  fact  augmented the  
suspicion  between Iran  and  its counterparts  and  increasing mistrust 
                                                            
4 -Ibid p129 
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between them. Facing this  situation, the  Iranians  reminded that their 
missile  as  well as their nuclear  arsenal has  for  only scope  to act  as  a 
deterrent  and  protect them from the surrounding potential  enemies and  
was not  intended to  engage in offensive actions  and  that the  Western 
countries headed by the USA  should  review their strategy in the  Gulf region. 
 By  another perspective,  the American military preparedness in the region 
was  useful  for the  Iranians to maintain them keeping  alert and pursuing 
the  development of their missile capabilities, concomitantly with their 
nuclear projects in order to be  able to target any  American military base 
which is  stationed in the Gulf. The existence of those  bases was in reality a  
source of threat  as well as opportunities for  Iran. 
To  analyze this angle of perception, it is necessary a  little  bit to  construct 
this  thought on theoretical pillars. The Concept of “ National interest” 
actually raised by Trump Administration in the USA has  always  been the 
base of the political taking decision in  Iran  under  which regime it  was. This  
concept of “ national interest” is  one  of the pillars of the realist theory 
advanced  by  Hans J. Morgenthau according to “ the realist theory of  
International Politics”.  By another way, Morgenthau distinguished between 
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temporary and permanent interests, and  specific  and  general interests.  An 
other scholar ,  Stephen Krasner, described  the national interest as a 
subjective variable because  this concept of  national interest changes with 
the movements of leadership  and  decision-makers. In another  side, the  
scholar Donald Nuechterlein  defined national interest as “the perceived  
needs  and  desires of  some  sovereign  State comprising its  external  
environment “5.  And the eminent  scientist J.Y.NYE has  conditioned a right 
definition of the “ National interest”  with the existence of  a “ well-informed  
and  transparent debate”. The national interest is  also  a  fusion of the 
objective materialistic  interest of a nation  combined with its moral   
aspirations. On the international realm, the  International society is  
considered  as anarchical where every entity looks for its own interest at the 
detriment of other’s interest. 
In the case of  Iran, the acquisition of nuclear programme capabilities serve 
its national interest by  serving mainly its national  security strategy. Like the  
concept of  “terrorism” the national  security of  a  country,  deserves diverse 
definitions  which  are  sometimes non-consensual. 
                                                            
5 N. Entessar- Iran Nuclear Negotiations- Rowman  & Littlefield Editions-PP132-2015- USA- 
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 By this  way,  we obtain  a  multitude of  different  definitions : 
Ch. Mair defines it as “the  capacity to  control those  domestic  and  foreign 
conditions that the public  opinion of  a  given community  believes necessary 
to  enjoy its own self-determination or  autonomy, prosperity and  well-
being”6. It is also  obvious that  the national security  strategy is  different  
between the nuclearized countries   and  the  non-nuclearized  countries. 
  Concerning Iran,  the neo-realist Waltz based its  study on the “ nuclear 
balancing” theory. In fact, he relies on the destabilizing power of the 
destabilizing Israel nuclear arsenal, that sanctions adds to  Iran  nuclear 
security and incite to a proliferation tendency. Nevertheless, the Iranians 
doesn’t base their nuclearization on the existence of  Israel and its threat 
because they manage to show that the israelian  arsenal is negligible. 
Normally, Israel is  not at the top of the  threats  against Iran because it is  
more  concerned about the  near  Pakistan, which is  of  Sunni obedience and  
has  a more important nuclear arsenal and the existence of the terrorist 
group is more eager to raise the question of nuclear terrorism. The main 
criticism to Waltz’s  assumption is  that Iran doesn’t require nuclear  
                                                            
6 Ibid -PP133 
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weapons to  safeguard its national  security interests and that  any  attempt 
to  disseminate nuclear weapons in the region would  conclude in arm race 
destabilizing all the region. Regardless of the  behavior of USA, it is  
considered the  most  efficient detterent to  Iran  nuclear in the regio but  
Iran’s  national security is  a  most important issue related  to other 
important issues like:  
1- The balance of  strategic nuclear forces in the Gulf  region 
2- The conventional military balance in the Gulf 
3- The prospects for deterioration of the relations  in the  Middle-East 
4- The probability of the nuclear proliferation including by non-state 
actors like terrorists. 
This  situation is   aggravated  by the proximity of many nuclear-armed 
states(Russia, China, Pakistan, India and Israel),  which  shows  that is  
surrounded by unreliable neighbors and that in the  hope  to  see  a  
dismantlement of the  Iranian nuclear capabilities in this  situation is  
improbable. This risky context enlarges the concern to other concerns 
of national security like  “ cyberwarfare” against its  facilities  and  
cooperate in order to  strengthen its abilities  in matter of defense  
against  cyberattacks. 
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 Some scholars emphasize  another characteristic to the  Iranian 
Nuclear Security which is  based on its  “loneliness”. Iran, in reality,  is  
acting like “ a regional pivot” with developing a  regional local network 
of  alliances through the Chiaa in  Baghdad,  Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
Hamas and  Islamic Jihad in  Palestine.  Those  facts completely refute 
the theory of  “ strategic loneliness”  alleged by those scholars. 
2- US position on Iranian nuclear programme : 
In this compartment,  the book of  Saira KHAN ,  Iran  and Nuclear Weapons 
– Protracted conflict  and proliferation- is  based on a research done by the  
author with the title “  Iran-US protracted conflict and Iran’s Nuclear 
Ambition”7launched in 2007.This book explains how  was the  evolution of 
the  US position facing the nuclear Iranian programme  from 1947 to after 
2000. This book, written by an Iranian researcher paves the  way of the  
American’s position on the nuclear Iranian  during  a big part of our scope  
                                                            
7 - Saira Khan-Iran and Nuclear Weapons- Protracted Conflict and Proliferation.- 
Routledge Global Security Studies- UK 2010- 
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and length of my research , beginning from  1953, after the coup sustained 
by the  Americans on Iranian Prime  Minister in 1952 - Mossadegh. 
 The concerns of  International  Community  about Iranian Nuclear 
programme have begun in the  90’s and  became more  serious since the 
beginning of the  21st century, after its  advancement in Uranium enrichment 
facilities.” Iran’s protract conflict  with the US began at the  End of the Shah 
Period  and the Islamic Revolution which transformed  the country in  a 
republican theocracy in  1979 because  Iran considered the US which was 
previously  an ally of the  Shah’s regime, the  major enemy of the Islamic  
countries and  was  still  supporting their toughest enemy in the region , 
Israel. The latter  became the enemy of  Iran from the  80’s because  Iran 
sustained , Hezbollah (of  Shi’i obedience) in Lebanon., which  was  the  first  
enemy of  Israel in the region  after Syria and engaged in proxy -wars  in the  
name of Iran. After finishing  war with Iraq in 1988, Iran found itself  facing 
a very  strong  and  hegemonic  nation, the United States, which couldn’t be  
deterred without nuclear  weapons especially  as  this  superpower identified 
Iran as  a “ rogue state” and  declaring  it part of “the axis of  evil” by the  
Bush’s administration. This  study  has  tried  to  explain the need of  Iran to  
nuclear proliferation  by  a  number of reasons :  
19 
- Engagement of the  state in protracted conflicts 
- Existence of many nuclear rivals in the region (Israel). 
- Existence of  a superpower rival  with high nuclear capacity (USA) 
According to Saira’s research,  Realism based on  Anarchy is not  sufficient to 
explain the  Iranian need to Nuclear Proliferation. She Considers that this is 
the gap on Realism  but  adopts  the constructivist  approach which declares 
that “ Anarchy is  what  states make of it”,  and that the number of  conflicts 
where a  country is  involved  directly or  by proxy are  very  decisive in  the  
choice of  trying to possess nuclear  weapons or not. This book is divided in 
three  main parts: 
 -1- The Causes of  Proliferation  and  justifications of  Iran’s  
motivations to  aspire to  Nuclear Weapons 
2-Theoretical explanations  of  nuclear weapons acquisition: which are at the  
center of the research  and to explain why Iran is  really in need of  Nuclear 
Weapons . The theory is expected to be applicable across protracted conflict 
cases.  
 3-  The  Case  study of Iran : According to  her  hypothesis based on 
protracted conflicts ,  Saira KHAN divided her  study into four major phases:  
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-1st phase -  This part targets the Iranian nuclear ambition in the period  
between 1947 and 1979. The two defined conflicts  are with Israel since 1947 
and with Iraq since  1950  but in this period  ,  Iraq as Sunni- Oriented was  
considered as  the first enemy of Iran in the region of  the Middle-East.  
2nd phase- from  1979 onwards a triple conflict:  This period was  
characterized by the Islamic revolution  which led  to the Shah deposition 
and Islamic Republic Creation.  From  1980 to 1988, Iran was kept busy  with 
its  war  against Iraq  and  the  new  conflict emerging with the  US , especially  
after the American  embassy   hostages issue. 
-3rd phase: The  deterioration of the relations  between Iran and  the USA 
conducted to the necessity for Iran to develop quickly its  nuclear program 
me (1990-2000). State and  el Qaeda. This phase  is  mainly  characterized by  
a cooperation between Iran and North Korea in order to develop the 
technology of Missiles and treatment of  fissile materials. 
4th  PHASE- Quick proliferation process  since 2000 and intensification of the 
Conflict  with the US.  This  situation  was emphasized with the presence of 
the  US in the region  since the  Gulf war and  declaration of  Iran  as part of 
“ the axis of  evil” after 09/11 events and the US establishing links between 
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Iran as  a State and  el Qaeda as the first terrorist movement targeting the 
USA. 
- In his  book entitled “ US Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran – From the War on 
Terror to the Obama Administration”, Kumuda Simpson , try to explain the 
relations  between the  USA and Iran from the Cold War to the Nuclear deal 
reached with  Iran in 2013 by the Obama Administration. 
  This  book,  which is  initially a thesis presented  by the  author try to 
show  a  perspective  of the American- Iranian relations in this  large period  
of history (1945-2013) and  also to hypothesize on the influence of the 
nuclear programme on the future of the relations  of Iran not only with the  
USA,   but also with its  rivals  and partners in the  Middle- East and  in the 
West. 
The discussion on the  Iranian nuclear programme has  been always  linked 
with the  declaration of  Iran  as “ a rogue state” and forecasting the  worst 
scenario as the outcome of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons  and its  influence 
on the geostrategic interest of the  USA and its partners in the Middle-East 
Region. The behavior of  Iran , in this perspective has  always been linked 
with  some terrorist  and  violent movements  existing in the Middle-East like 
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its  support to the Assad regime and  Hamas in Palestine as  well as Hezbollah 
in Iran,  all those rivals of Israel, the  main partner of the USA   in the region. 
This  book is  mainly  divided in  six  chapters.  
The First Chapter is  an overview of  US nuclear policy  during the Cold  War 
and the role  played by the United States in providing help  and supply to  
Iran to develop its nuclear programme in hope  to  balance the role played 
by the USSR in the region and countering Iran from  adopting  Communism  
as an ideology. 
-The third important book to  describe the relations  between the  US and 
Iran about its nuclear programme is the book of Roham  Alvandi,  “ Nixon,  
Kissinger and the Shah : The United States and Iran in the  Cold War”.  This 
book talks about  a  specific period  in the  Cold  war. Mohamed  Reza, the 
Shah of Iran , has struggled  between the  two important  superpowers at 
that time,  the USA and Russia , between  1941 and  1979,  period  of his  long 
reign, interrupted  by the Islamic revolution.  This  author establishes a link 
between the  conflictive relationship of Iran  with its  neighbor Iraq, that 
initiated the  Iranian regime  to have  recourse to  a  nuclear programme as 
a   mean of deterrence. In 1975,  and  after the  signature of  Algiers 
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Agreement with Iraq,  Iran  attained its military  superiority  enjoying military 
material  supply from the Americans and  began to put in  action their 
nuclear programme. Their was  a very strong  relation between the  Shah in 
one  hand and  Nixon and Kissinger in the other hand.  But after the 
Watergate incident,  the relation between the  Shah and  the  President Ford  
was not  so warm.  The  book of  Alvandi is  presented in  four  chapters :  the  
first chapter describes the  Iranian  american relations after the  second  
World  War and the access of Nixon to the presidency of the USA    and its 
sequential raising influence in the Middle-East and in the  2nd chapter  how 
the  Shah used this privileged  relation in the Iranian benefit. Remarkably, 
the last  chapter emphasizes the impact of the negotiations  between  Iran 
and the USA over the Iranian Nuclear Programme  and the declining 
relationship trend  catalyzed by the  accession of  President Ford to the i 
White House. According  to  Alvandi, the downfall of the Shah has  been 
accelerated by his  authoritarian policy  and his support of the  Coup 
organized concomitantly by the American and  the  British against the 
Nationalist Prime Minister of Iran,  Mossadegh, in  1953  and  furthermore 
due  to his  submissive position to the Status of Forces Agreement of 1964 
which praised the American Personnel stationed in Iran with full immunity. 
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Second Alvandi, It was those reasons most of  all which precipitated the 
Shah’s reign decay.  
 
3-Russian position on Iranian Nuclear programme:  
 Some  documents target the  question of the Russian Position on the 
Iranian Nuclear Programme. The Russian relationship with Iran have always 
been controversial and  defiant to its respective relationship with the USA, 
especially over the nuclear Iranian programme. From those documents,  a 
basic and important one is the document established by the  National 
Defense  University in 2012 on “ Russia and the Nuclear Program me Replay 
or break through”.  According to this research, the 8relations  between 
Russia  and Iran  have  been very complex and  changing. This relationship is  
also tributary of the  evolution of the relations  between Russia  in the USA 
Which have recently deteriorated after the  American invasion of Iraq  
despite Russian objection and the interference of  USA in revolutions in 
Georgia, Ukraine  and  Kyrgyzstan and the delivery of missiles S300 to Iran in  
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November 2016 according to the  bilateral contract established  in 20079. 
The importance of the  issue of those  missiles  was  very decisive in the 
bilateral relations  between Russia and  Iran because “ S300 ( 150 km of 
distance targeted  with maximal  altitude of 27 kilometers) would  enhance 
the Iranian’s  confidence in facing eventual  air strikes  from the  USA or Israel 
directed  to its  nuclear facilities  located in Bushehr or Natanz.” 
From  an other perspective,  Iran,  under the rule of  President Mahmoud  
AhmadiNedjad has  engaged in talks with  the US and its P5+1 partners on 
supplying fuel for the Tehran Research’s Reactor (TRR). Moreover, the 
revelation in 2009 of the  existence of a  secret enrichment plant in Fordow  
highly challenged the trust bond  between Iran  and its partners  as  well as  
Russia and induced Medvedev, in that time  to issue a statement at the G20-
Summit in Pennsylvania where he  highlighted Iran’s failure to notify the  
IAEA’S about this hidden facility for several years. 
Afterwards, in Geneva it was  agreed to supply Iran from Europe  through 
Russia  raw material  (unconvertible to  weapon material) to treat some  
diseases by nuclear medicine. 
                                                            
 
26 
Afterwards, and  due to the sustainment of Russia to  Mahmoud Ahmadi 
Nedjad and the  conservative Iranian wing,  after its reelection in 2009, the 
bilateral relations  between Russia and Iran  have improved. Subsequently, 
this relationship  worsened when Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da 
Silva alleged that he could help Iran on TRR with the Turkish contribution. In 
fact, this initiative  was not backed by Russia. According to UNSC resolution 
1929, Iran has not the right to enrich Uranium to  a level of 4% but in reality, 
it is not possible to construct an  atomic weapon with less than a level of 
Uranium enrichment of 20%. This fact explains to what extent this condition 
in the resolution is unrealistic. 
After passage of the UNSC Resolution 1929, it was created a Russian-Iranian 
Consortium  in Mines, Mining Industries for  constructing atomic plants. 
Russia was  also  about to  engage  a  contract on oil  and  gas  with Russia, 
but the main obstacle where the  sanctions imposed internationally on the 
Iranian companies. Moreover, “ in the  energy  sector Russian  and  Iranian 
interests  are too competitive to allow  for cooperation”. 
In general, the relations with Iran represented  for Russia a tool to leverage 
its relations with the US while in the  same time trying to  acquire confidence 
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in relations with Iran and to reduce the impact of its threat in the region if it  
acquires more  nuclear capacities, but in general, Russian experts do not 
believe like the  west that Iran could be  able le to  acquire a  nuclear weapon. 
By an other perspective, the interest of Russia to Iranian Nuclear Program 
me is  driven by defensive concerns  like the fact that “ Iran might support 
Islamic militants in Central Asia and North Caucasus but act in the way to 
guarantee that Iran, a  Shia  recognized country,  is guaranteed by Russia as 
a strong  ally in its  war  against  Extremist Sunnis in the boarding states of 
Russia as well as  in Afghanistan. Iran  acted  as a Defensor of Russia in the 
Organization of  the Islamic Council (OCI) but has  also assisted the Russian 
efforts in combatting Islamism in Chechnya. 
 The positioning of Russia with Iran was  emphasized with the  Arab  spring 
in 2011 as the  Iranian power  increased in Lebanon,  Syria, Iraq and other 
Arab countries. In general Russia has  great interest in  avoiding a military 
crisis where Iran is  involved in the Middle-East. 
 How would  be the reaction of Russia in case of  a military action on Iran 
and its position on the middle-eastern considerations? 
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As we know, tension in the  Middle-East always rise the prices of oil. And  
tension in this region is  in general destined to maintain oil prices very high. 
Since 2011, the Russian government seemed  to be concerned  by  any Israeli 
attack on Iran and  consider a possible attack as “a disaster in the Middle-
East”. The  eventuality of  supplying Russian military assistance to Iran has 
also strongly sustained in case of  strikes  or attacks  by US, Israel or NATO 
forces. While Iran Russian treaty signed in 2001 previewed only “ not to give  
any help to the  aggressor” which is a  noticeable important evolution in the 
Russian position. 
A second  document, explains an  article written in the  Journal Asian  and 
African Studies – The Nuclearization of Iran  and the Policy of Russia- by its 
author, Mohamed Thowhidul Islam, in its  Vol 22 number 2 of 2013 . 
According to him,  many incentives   have  driven  Russia to support Iran’s  
Nuclear programme despite the Western fear ,  and  on head  of it  the USA 
of the consequences of the  evolution of this  programme   on the  region  
and  on the whole  World’s  peace  and  stability. He tried  in his  article  to 
explain the Russian specific  view  on this programme. His vision is  that the  
Russian perspective is the result of  a disjunction between the Iranian 
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position  and the Western  countries one.10Iran  claims  that its programme 
is  definitely civil-oriented but  the  western  countries  argue that they are 
in fact hiding military objectives behind the pacific implementations.  Many 
economic  and geopolitical considerations incite  Russia to  sustain the 
Iranian nuclear programme despite the occidental arguments  as  a 
permanent member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) and 
detainer of the  Veto with the help  and  sustainment of  China which is as 
well on the  same  position on the issue of the  Iranian Nuclear Programme. 
Russia’s  view  is  based on the recognition of legality of the  Nuclear Iranian 
Programme condoned by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). 
According  to the  author , the  Russian position is supported by the 
“ geopolitics of the Middle-East, Russia’s  economic interest, and  its need to 
export weapons, that its  always  looking for potential customers. 
3-Edited by A. Nikitin and  Morten  Bremer Maerli, the  article related to the 
NATO Science for Peace and  Security Series – Vol 33 -, 2008,  entitled 
“ Tuning Priorities in Nuclear Arms Control and  Non-Proliferation”- aims  to  
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compare the  Russian position towards the Iranian Nuclear  with the western 
visions.11 
In the 5th chapter of this  article the , author I. Safranchuk, Director of the 
Moscow Branch of the World  Security Institute, try to  explain the “Russian 
position on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis” prevailing from 2006. According to 
him,  the Russian vision could  be  explained by different ways. While  a group 
of scholars justify the Russian position by its  need to reduce the  American 
hegemony in the  region and  to  complicate its  situation of good  standing 
with its regional partners,  an other group try to  explain it by its  economic 
interests with Iran. But those two  explanations  seem to be  too simplistic  
and limitative.  Therefore,  other more deep  explanations managed to stress 
on the Strategic Considerations of the Russian Position. The Author criticize 
the Russian vision by  being “ volatile”12.  The Russian position has two 
formulations based mainly on two  dynamics: the “regional” vs “ the “global” 
dynamic’ in one hand  and the “ pragmatism” vs “  principles” dynamic. 
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a- The global vs  “ regional dynamics:  Russia sees the Iranian 
nuclear programme under this double prism dimension. This  
angle  of  vision is constructed on the pillars of the  antagonism 
“ Optimistic” vs  “Pessimistic”. In fact,  while  the pessimists think 
that the  NPT ( Non- Proliferation Treaty ) has effectively reduced 
the  access of  countries to  nuclear weapons technology, the 
optimists see that after  abandoning their nuclear ambitions  for 
other reasons,  and  in order to  achieve  certain interests in  
different realms,  some countries joined the NPT. The global 
context for  Russia  is  quite clear, thus, if Iran acquire nuclear  
Weapons, the NPT would lose its presumed  role  and lead  to  a  
more dangerous  situation   where the risk  of  a lethal  nuclear 
war would  exponentially grow. This is  what is previewed  in the 
global dynamics. By opposition,  
- The second vision is the regional dynamics which is  for the 
Russian  strategy most important in the Caspian region ( near Iran) 
and its economic interests in Chechnya. The  neighboring 
countries with Russia former members of USSR   are more and  
more cooperating with the  US  and  among of them  Azerbaijan 
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is the most  concerned about Iran’s  nuclear threat because of 
proximity reasons. 
- b- the pragmatism vs principles dynamics:  
-  The pragmatic vision suggests that even if  Iran acquire nuclear  
weapons,  Russia doesn’t feel rationally  enough threat  as  the   
USA, Israel and  Saudi Arabia. 
- The principles vision sustains  that the Iranian  issue cannot be  
solved outside the  legal international framework relative to the 
“ Primakov Doctrine”13  which  draws the lines  of the Russian 
Foreign policy  since the USSR’ s decay  and the  ambition of the 
Russian empires ‘revival.  
- The combination of those  dynamics gives  Russia’s three choices 
in facing the nuclear Iranian Programme  crisis : Tough, Medium 
and  Soft. 
 
1- The Global Principle Perspective : or soft dynamics .In Russia, 
the Primakov  Doctrine dominates  as international law is the 
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principal conductor of  Russian foreign policy  so their 
reference is  the judgement of IAEA  on the Iranian 
programme ,  so the Russian position is tributary of this 
“official “position  and  not aligned on western positions. 
Russia has  always cooperated with Iran  and  hoped  that no 
proof of  its  non-compliance standard would be 
demonstrated by the IAEA. But  after,  with the  election of  
Mahmoud  Ahmedi Nedjad in (2005-2006) , the relationship 
between Iran  and the  IAEA deteriorated and  the case  
submitted  by the IAEA itself to the UNSC and Russia  has 
fallen in a bad position. 
2- The Global-pragmatic perspective:  or the medium 
perspective:   
Finally,  afront a more nearest Iran to  acquire nuclear 
technology,  Russia becomes tougher. In this  vision,   not 
allowing Iran acquiring  a  nuclear bomb is  also among 
Russia's principles. 
3- Regional pragmatic perspective :  It is the hardest position of 
Russia.  It is  all focused on the dissensions between 
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Azerbaijan and  Iran .  As  Azerbaijan is keen to make alliances 
with US/NATO to face the Iranian possible belligerence. 
Facing this  situation,  and  due to the  importance of the 
Caspian region for the  Russian region, it finds  itself obliged 
to intervein,  The problem is if  Iran become nuclear, 
US/NATO would  undoubtedly seek to install a military base  
and assert its presence in Azerbaidjan.    And  as  this  situation  
would  not be  convenient for  Russia, it  shows more narrow 
relationships with  Azerbaidjan which a former member of 
the  USSR than  with Iran. This  fact induces the  toughness of  
Russia against Iran  and strengthen its position against its  
nuclear programme,  which is   susceptible to bring nuclear 
instability in the Caspian region. As a result,   since 2002, 
Russia has  shared   this  concern  about Iran  and  Azerbaijan  
misunderstandings. 
Among those three options,    Russia has managed to  balance  
between the soft  and  medium dynamics by  adopting a 
Tactical Dynamics because it  wants  conciliating its  interests 
with Iran as  well as those  with the  Western countries. In fact 
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Russia is submitted to  a dilemma. Iranian  authorities were 
nearly  sure that Russia will never vote  sanctions   against 
their country  at the UNSC.  Iran  and from 2006, has  tried  to 
make the pressure on Russia in order to  make its  decisive  
choice between its  interests in the  West and its alignment  
with  Iran,  but Russia has  always’ obviously preferred the  
compromise  and has  never accepted  the eventuality of  
strikes  on  Iran as  a  result to the  advancement of its  nuclear 
programme because Russia is  more interested  in reinforcing 
its  economical interests in the Middle- East than participating 





 Chapter III- Russia’s Policy on Iran’s Nuclear Program  
1- Iran’s  Background: . 
Islamic Republic of Iran is  constituted  of multiple  ethnic groups : in 
majority Persian and  Azeri but with minorities of Mazandarani, Kurdish, 
Arab, Baluch and  Turkmens’ is  a country  with  Muslim majority: 90% Shia 
and  7% Sunna. It  benefits of many natural resources  like : Oil, Natural Gas  
and Minerals. 
The Qajar Dynasty ruled  Iran from  1795 to 1925. In  1921,  Reza khan ,  an 
Army official led  a Coup and  was  named Minister of Defense, and  Prime 
Minister and  finally he made himself  Shah of Iran in 1925 with surname 
Pahlavi. During  World  War 2, in  1941 he  was  obliged to  abdicate in favor 
of his  son Med Reza Pahlavi,  who ruled  Iran, until the Islamic Revolution in 
1979. During his  reign, Iran enjoyed  high economic prosperity and 
modernization but opposition movement against the  shah dictatorship was  
rising until Khomeini guided  this movement in 1978  and  after popular 
movements created  the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.From 1980 to  1988 
Iran was engaged in the Iran-Iraq war. Khamenei succeeded to Khomeini in 
1989 as religious leader under the  political rule  of Ali Akbar Hashemi 
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Rafsanjani (1989-1997) followed  by Mohamed Khatami (1997-2005) and 
then Mahmoud  Ahmadinejad . 
Foreign Policy in Iran is  guided by the National Security Council (NSC) . Its  
foreign policy goals  are mainly “  enhancing the  status of regional power of 
the country”, reducing foreign interferences in the region especially the US 
ones and asserting its right to pursue nuclear power technology. 
Furthermore, it aims to support and  sustain Islamic revolutionary 
movements in the neighboring countries. Since 1979,  Iran is  considered a 
non- aligned power. Furthermore, the  accession of Mahmoud  Ahmadi 
Nedjad  as President of Iran , conducted to escalation of tensions because 
the position of the latter was  very confrontational with the  Western 
countries  especially the US,  and on the issue of Iran’s  nuclear civilian 
program which is  alleged to be a cover for military nuclear capability 
acquisition. 
The  first time, Iran  acquired nuclear technology was  in 1967, under the 
reign of  Med Reza Pahlavi SHAH (1941-1979),  a five megawatt research 
reactor of US origin and further  enrichment technology and  supply of 
Uranium provided by  some  western countries (France-Belgium-Spain -
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Italy) 14 . But why does Iran need to develop nuclear  energy  facilities? 
Because of its  richness in  natural resources like oil  and  natural gas,  
according to the US position, Iran doesn’t need  to develop  a nuclear 
technology.  Iran  justifies this interest by human security, energy security, 
and  economic  and  legal sovereignty reasons especially that Iran is bound 
by its  commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) sees 
having all the rights to proceed to development of nuclear fuel cycle. 
The Nuclear Iranian Programme roots back to the  aftermath of the  2nd  
World War  where the  Shah Mohamed Reza, who ruled  Iran from  1941 to  
1979 aspired to acquire nuclear technology for his  country. Following Coup 
against Mossadegh incited concomitantly by the  American  and the  British 
because his policy where  opposed to their  energetic  interests in the region. 
That’s  why the  historical timeline  of the  Nuclear Iranian Programme could  
be  divided in four main parts:  
 
a-During the Shah’s rule :  (1953-1979).        
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In  1957, after the  Coup to  Mossadegh,  “US and  Iran signed the 
Agreement for Cooperation on Civil Uses of  Atoms   and  IN 1959, US 
provided to Iran its  first five  Megawatt thermal Research  Reactor for 
the project of  a University’s  Nuclear Research Center.”15 In 1967, this  
facility received  around 05 kilograms  of  enriched Uranium susceptible 
to produce  a  nuclear bomb. After that,  Iran  signed the Non 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the  1st of  July 1968 and ratified the 2ND 
February 1970 and in  1974, Iran  signed the IAEA safeguards Agreement. 
A prolongation of the Treaty signed with the US  was done  for ten (10) 
more years. 
Subsequently,  and  encouraged  by this  Treaty, Iran decided to build 
Nuclear Power Plants in  Southern Iran.16 
b.- After the Islamic Revolution  and the Deposition of the  Shah in 
1979:  
 “ The new  Islamic Regime led by  Ayatollah Khomeini was not  at the  
beginning interested with the  nuclear program  as  its predecessor but  
changed his mind  after Iraq’s  bombing of the Bushehr Nuclear  plant 
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during the Iran-Iraq  war in the  1980’s . As a result of this repositioning, 
China  began to restart its nuclear programme  with the help of  China  
and India as  well as Pakistan (Abdul Qadeer KHAN network). Two other 
important events catalyzed the Iranian interest in  Nuclear technology, 
the dismantlement of the USSR  and the growing influence of the USA 
in the region  and subsequently the  Iraqi  invasion of  Kuwait in 1991. 
     c-During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad  Era:  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected the first time  in 2005 and  reelected in 
2009 for a period of o4 years each. At that time, the USA was engaged in war  
against terrorism  after the 09/11 events and accusing many  countries of  
sustaining international terrorism,  and  among them was  Iran. After that,  
Iran and  its ally  G.W. Bush. Those series of  events were about to  shape 
more precisely the  relationship between  the US and  Iran in the period  after  
and exacerbating the differences on the Iranian  nuclear programme .” Over 
the next eight years, the Bush administration pursued  a policy towards Iran 
with belligerent  aspects: intrusive inspections  by the IAEA, harsh economic  
sanctions and offensive diplomatic  strategy on the multilateral  scene”17. In 
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fact, at that time, the USA was intending  harder and  harder repellents  
against  Iran  and  thinking as  well of military  strikes in order to induce  Iran  
to reduce its  nuclear  ambitions   and  stop Uranium enrichment projects,. 
In 2007, the UNSC members  adopted unanimously the resolution 1737  
which  called  Iran to interrupt  Uranium enrichment and  comply with IAEA 
recommendations as  well to  call upon Iran providers  of  nuclear material 
and  technology to  avoid  those  acts. Nevertheless, Iran remained  attached 
to its  right to acquire nuclear know-how and facilities  for  pacific purposes. 
And if the Bush administration was  relatively  reluctant  to  attack Iran 
militarily,  she was really concerned about an eventual military strike 
engaged by its partner Israel because this file  was constituting in the Middle-
East an existentialist concern.  But after Ahmadinejad election  and 
reelection in 2009 , America was sure for 100% that Iran  was not  eager to 
perform a political  change  and  more “screwed”  to a conservative  vision,  
and  as   a  consequence,  the USA had begun to think about  a regime  change 
triggered from inside. This  state  of  confusion and  instability remained  until 
the election of President B.Obama in the USA but the position of the latter 
diverted from its predecessor’s and he  showed more  inclination  to  
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negotiate  with the Iranian regime in order to  achieve any  kind  of  
agreement as  well as  he intensified the  economic  sanctions targeting 
especially the  financial Iranian system  and its  oil-oriented activities.  That 
is the way ,  Obama used  the stick and  Carrot policy in order to incite  Iran 
to return to the global order, obey the IAEA safeguards and  join the 
negotiation table with the  main World  deciders.  But was really noticed is  
that in the  first  four years  of his  election, Obama has  very little realizations 
on the  Iranian file. Instead,  Iran  continued  to  develop its  nuclear 
programme without caring too much about the different threatens  and  the 
reprobation of the international community. In the context of the  Arab 
uprisings, Iran gained more  and  more influence in the Middle-East. In fact,  
Obama has had  its  own vision on nuclear non-proliferation: he thought that 
disarmament and  nuclear non-proliferation should  target  every state and  
not only Iran. For him, non-proliferation is a standard that should  be 
respected by  everyone on the international  scene. Facing the nuclear 
Iranian issue  was based first of  all  according to  Obama on the diplomatic  
available means,  namely the negotiation,  and consequently opened this 
door extensively comparatively to  G.W. Bush. In order to better the  US-
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Iranian relationship  and incite this  country to halt  Uranium’s  enrichment 
at the lowest possible  cost. 
The reelection of  Ahmadinejad in2009 who  showed in his  electoral 
campaign a level of openness to negotiation with the  P5+1 , encouraged 
Obama to  abandon the  previous American  attachment to  democracy 
promotion in  Iran  and to be  more  concerned   about  advancement in  
consensus over the nuclear issue. 
After the violence of the Iranian regime  against protesters to his  reelection, 
Obama was  obliged to  sharpen the tools of sanction  against Iran to induce 
the regression of its  accession to  the nuclear technology and Uranium 
enrichment; but in the reality the toughness of  the  Americans ‘position 
resulted in more defiance from the Iranian counterpart. Further, the  Arab 
uprisings which were  launched from  2011, reduced the  confidence  
between the USA and its  Arab allies and  had given more leverage to Iran to 
reinforce its position in the region  and  grow its influence. Moreover, it has  
been  comforted  by the  fall of Saddam regime in Iraq and the access of the 
Shia to rule this country  with more probability of cooperation with Iran. 
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By opposition to his first term, the second term of presidency of M.Obama  
has  seen  a betterment shift in the US-Iranian relations  because of the 
election of Hassan  Rouhani recognized  as a reformist and showing his 
willingness to negotiate more in order to  ameliorate the economic  situation 
of Iran  and its  
  
d-Last evolutions with JPCOA, US withdrawal and actual  situation. The 
pressure put on Iran  after its  defiance to the international  order  and  its  
progressive tentative of Uranium  enrichment an conducted the  US and its 
partners to take strong actions against Iran  aiming to isolate it on the 
international  scene. But,  at the same time,  the international  community 
has  left the  door open to incite  Iran to rejoin this order. The P5+1 countries 
reiterate the offerings  made to Iran by 2006 to reach  a  specific deal  
susceptible  to reduce the  hostilities  between those  countries  and  Iran   
and insure its  voluntary and  complete adherence to the international  
standards leading at the summum of their implementation to the non-
proliferation orientation . This  deal  mentioned  specifically some  
interesting measures for Iran.  Among them: the  assistance to  Iran for its 
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intended nuclear program me  with pacific use realization  and  development,  
nuclear fuel  supply,  and assistance  in  many  other  strategic and  economic  
fields and  the  alleviation of the  sanctions which were harming and hurdling 
its  economy. But, to pay the  cost of those  advantages,  Iran had the 
obligation to  suspend its country’s proliferation  tentative  of  belligerent  
nature and  comply  with  all the standards and recommendations dictated 
by the IAEA,  and it  was on the top  of the  achievements reached after the  
signature of this  deal in  Geneva in 2015 ,  was the best  what could be 
reached with  Iran with diplomatic  means and  reduce the  maximum  
probability for an  American led war in this part of the Middle- East region. 
Unfortunately  after having being  consolidated and really  realized, the 
JPCOA has been  and is till now  really threatened after the accession of 
Donald Trump to the US presidency and the  withdrawal of the USA from this 
deal because considering it  more favorable to Iran  and  against the 
American interest and  the subsistence of this deal  is really  at risk  even if 
the other countries part of it  are  assuring Iran to comply to the  deal 




2-Russia’s Policy Statements: 
Besides the  academic references   and  journals tackling the  different 
positions  towards the  Iranian Nuclear  Programme, the major source for 
defining the positions of the  two countries,  namely,  USA  and  Russia,  is  
definitely represented by the  declarations   and statements  
 In reaction to the US withdrawal from the Nuclear  Deal with Iran, the 
Russian  News Agency Tass did  a declaration in  name of a Russian  senator 
who  said “ The United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal is  quite 
a  realistic  scenario, especially  after the  congress,  which was  utterly  
negative about the agreement, joins  the discussion”18 
 First of all, we have the  basis address where President Donald Trump try 
to explain his position why he was  convinced  that America’s  withdrawal 
from the Iranian Nuclear Deal is  first  of  all in the interest of the USA because 
Donald Trump think this  deal  is  more on the  Iranian side than in the  
western  side. In his address, President Trump said “We cannot prevent 
an Iranian bomb under the decaying and rotten structure of the 




current agreement, Therefore, I am announcing today that the 
United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.”19 
 In fact the utility of the  deal is  incommensurable as said by  James Acton, 
Director of the Carnegie Endowment Nuclear Policy Programme “ With the 
deal in place, it  would  be  extremely difficult for Iran to build the bomb 
without being  detected and  there  would  be  a time frame that allow  the  
international  community to react”.  At the  moment, the ball is  in the  camp 
of the occidental countries  : if they maintain their position  and  continue  
to trade  economically with Iran,  nothing will change  significantly but if they  
decide to follow  the  secondary  sanctions    ordered  by the US,  the most 
valuable  choice  would  be  for Iran  not  to  stick  to its  commitments and  
pursue its  quest for the  nuclear weapons and  Uranium  enrichment  
without limits  and  at whatever cost. 
 As a response to those premonitions, according to Sergei Kislyiak, Russia’s 
former ambassador to the United States, “ the Iran Nuclear Deal is  not an 
US- Iranian agreement, it is a  multilateral  agreement endorsed by the UNSC 
                                                            
19 https://www.vox.com/ Zack Beauchamp-Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran  Nuclear 
Programme- May 2018 
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and  enjoying a special  status” which means  that the American’s  
withdrawal would affect the nuclear deal  with Iran only partially. For 
precision, this  deal  was reached in July 2015,  during the Obama 
Administration between Iran and  its  six mediators (USA, UK, France, 
Germany , China and Russia). The deal  which has  been implemented since 
January 2016,  Iran  has  the obligation to curb its nuclear activities and  to 
be regularly  inspected  and  transparent with the IAEA in  exchange of the  
abandonment of the  sanctions  prevailing from its partners. 
Moreover on the 8TH OF may 2018,  and just  after the  official  
confirmation  of  D. Trump of the  withdrawal of his  country from the defined 
Deal,  the  Russian reaction  has  not been delayed  at  all as  seen  with Mr 
Kislyak declaration but  has  also been followed  by an official  statement by 
the  Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs”.  This statement have had a very 
negative  attitude on the American withdrawal from the JCPOA. The 
representant of the Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs  said expressly “ We 
are deeply disappointed by US President Donald Trump’s decision to unilaterally 
give up commitments to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on 
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Iran’s nuclear programme  (JCPOA) and to reinstate the US sanctions on Iran.”20and   
he  asserted  that this deal doesn’t belong to the US alone but to the  whole  
international community. “There are no and cannot be any grounds for 
undermining the JPCOA. The Plan has proved its absolute relevance. It 
efficiently tackles all the challenges it is designed to address.” And  confirm 
the  utility of this  agreement with  no  doubt and considers the  American  
action  as a clear discrepancy with the majority’s  position  and more than 
that a  sign of mistrust towards the IAEA.  And finally,  while criticizing the 
American position, he  confirmed the  conviction of  Russia to pursue this 
agreement  at any cost as  considered the “ best deal” and  also to  sustain 
Iran  in its positions and in its nuclear programme as  long  as  this country 
sticks  to the  agreement and  more e importantly  complies  with the  IAEA’S 
directives  and  its international  commitments in general, the  fact that has  
been respected by  Iran till now,  from the implementation of this  
agreement till now, according to the Russian official vision.  
In fact, this Russian attitude towards the JPCOA  deal has  been uniform from 
the initial step on reaching this agreement on the highest levels in the 
                                                            
20  Foreign Ministry of  Russia- Statement on Developments around the JPCOA on Iran’s 
Nuclear Programme -08 may 2018 
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Russian government. This is  obviously highlighted in the president Vladimir 
Putin statement after the  achievement of the deal on July 2015, “Russia 
welcomes the agreement reached today in Vienna on a settlement 
of the situation concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and the joint 
comprehensive plan of action approved by the six countries and Iran. We are 
certain that the world heaved a sigh of relief today”21 and he confirmed that 
the  main pillar of this  agreement  was in  accordance with the International 
Law represented by the IAEA and  its recommendations  and  that he 
expected that this position  would  be  surely  condoned by all the members  
of the UNSC in order that the  option of  stability  and  peace overcomes the  
calls upon the use  of force and  violence.  
 He agreed  as well that this  deal would  be  of great benefit to  Iran as it 
would  submit all its  nuclear activities to the IAEA’ S  appreciation, help Iran 
to  develop its nuclear pacific programme in  stability, provide it with relief 
                                                            
21 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49957 Statement by President of  
Russia V.Putin following  Completion of Negotiation on Iran Nuclear Programme.-
14 July 2015 
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from  economical  sanctions harming its  internal politics and  opening the 
doors  for  more opportunities of  Cooperation for  developing this program 
e that could be furnished by  Russia. 
And finally he  declared that this  deal is  certainly a first step in the 
realization of the  Russian’s policy  vision in the region  which aims  to  
achieve “ global Nuclear Non-Proliferation and  to achieve the two main 
basic  goals expected in this region:  “ a Middle-East Nuclear- Free zone” and 
“ a  regional coalition for fighting and eradicating terrorism”. 
 And from the beginning of the  election term of Mr Trump,  and  his 
declaration of intention to  quit the  nuclear deal between the  P5+1, “Russia 
has warned Donald Trump's administration not to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal 
- saying America's withdrawal would harm “predictability, security, stability and 
non-proliferation around the world”.22 And  on the same  order,  Dmitri Peskov, 
Putin’  spokesman stated to the reporters that “the US move against the nuclear 
deal would have “very negative consequences” and would “seriously aggravate the 
situation around the Iranian nuclear dossier”. 
                                                            
22 https://www.independent.co.uk/- H.Cokcburn- Russia warns Trump over Iran nuclear 
deal: 'US withdrawal will seriously aggravate situation'-13/10/2017 
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And more than that, to precise the  Russian position,  it  worth it  to cite the  
condemnation expressed in 2007 by President  Putin  of “any almost 
uncontained hyper use  of force in international relations” and the  call of 
his  Minister of  Foreign Affairs,  Sergei Lavrov addressed to the  USA  to 
“ show  such  flexibility and  pragmatism in  approaching  Iran,  just it has   
shown towards  North Korea”  as  well as the  explanation of the  crisis 
persistence due  to “ the unwillingness of the US to  normalize its  bilateral 
relations with Tehran”. 
3-Analysis:  
 The aim of international  countries to prevent Iran to  acquire  know-how 
and  capacities for Uranium enrichment is  largely outdated but the  
international  community, is   still rationally able  to prevent  Iran  from  
having a  nuclear  bomb.   The last  nuclear deal  JPCOA between the Iran  
and the P5+1 countries was the optimal achievement realized for this  
objective. Unfortunately, the last American  withdrawal from this  deal was   
a  shock and  a  huge factor of destabilization to this deal  as the USA  are  a  
major actor in this  accord  and  in the Middle-East region. Engagements 
Accompanied with the  sanctions imposed on  Iran and  its economic partner  
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and  allies, this withdrawal could  incite more Iran to  stick to its  positions 
and  why not review  all its  commitments with the IAEA, and  feeling 
unsecure about the occidental engagement and trust is lost.  As a 
consequence,  Iran could review its commitments and   aspire newly to  
acquire nuclear  weapons without  any remorse because the  deal was  
broken by the western  counterpart. 
The Russian position can easily be  explained by its  actual Nuclear Policy 
which considers itself still a power and  wants to  conserve its position. 
Moreover,  Iran,  which is  considered  by the USA   as a rogue state ,  and  is 
in  an open opposition  with the  US , in  Russia’s  view is  interested to  obtain 
its  protection  against the US.  Furthermore, Russian’s experience  with  Iran 
in  Tajikistan ( where Iran  contributed to  end the civil  war)  and  also in 
Chechnya were Russia in  entangled in  a  violent separatist  war  as  well as  
fundamentalist Sunni terrorism has been more than positive. And at the  End 
of the day,  Iran is  considered by Russia  as  strategic  regional actor  as  well 
as one  of its  important trade partners. 
  Of course,  Russia is at the  same position as  the USA against Iran’s   
acquisition of   a  nuclear bomb, but at the  same time it  hopes  the 
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resorption of this  crisis at the minimal  costs with  a  recognition of the 
“pacific”  nature of the  Iranian  Nuclear Programme.  And it is  finally of  
great  importance to remind that “ Iran is  the third  importer of  Russian 
weapons in the  World after China and  India”23  as  well as  it is  could  be a 
good  customer of its  technology material and  know-how in the  case that 
Iran  succeed to “ clean “ its position on the international  scene  and  
convince that its nuclear programme is  limited to peaceful  applications.  
And as Dmitri Trenin confirms  in his paper “ Russia will remain firmly 
committed to nuclear-non-proliferation,  At the  same time, Russia sees its 
cooperation attempts  with Iran as  an  equal commitment in importance  
and  is  strictly attached to the resolution of this  crisis, in all cases  by  
diplomatic means,  never with the use of force. 
 
                                                            
23 -  Dmitri Trenin- Russia’s  Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environnment- Proliferation 
Papers-2005- IFRI Security  Studies Department-France- 
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Chapter IV- CONCLUSION: 
• “. Although Moscow was willing to accept a larger Iranian civil nuclear 
program than the United States or the Europeans, opposed economic 
sanctions in principle, and sought throughout the nuclear talks to maintain 
good bilateral relations with Tehran, Russia played a key positive role in the 
negotiations, including by gaining Iran’s agreement to ship virtually its entire 
stock of enriched uranium to Russia. Its nonproliferation and commercial 
interests coincided. By supporting low limits on Tehran’s enrichment 
capacity, Moscow could ensure that Iran would remain dependent on Russia 
to provide fuel for its Russian-supplied power reactors.”24   This  is the  best 
probable  explanation .  Obviously, there is a big difference between the   
American view  and  the Russian view  towards the  Iranian Nuclear 
Proliferation Programme .  The difference of opinion has led Russia to take  
a  more conciliatory position on Iran  even  if the Russian position has  been 
changing according to the historic eras . Nevertheless, both  countries have 
contributed more or less in  elaborating this nuclear programme but this was  
always depending in major  shifts in power  and  diplomatic  dominance 
                                                            
24 https://www.brookings.edu/ Robert Einhorn-Prospects of US-Russian Non-Proliferation  
Cooperation-26/02/2016 
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between them. According to their relative bilateral relationships, after the 
cold  war, Russia  was viewing Iran more like a potential trade partner than  
an enemy in the region. While it shares  with the international  community,  
especially the USA, the  concern which  consists in preventing  Iran from 
preventing a  nuclear  weapon,  as  well as its  urgent call to  Iran to  stop or 
reduce at the  foremost its  Uranium enrichment actions, Russia is  against 
the military action to  achieve this  goal and is  opposed  as well as it asserts 
the usefulness of the  economic  sanctions  against Iran and  believes that 
those  sanctions “ are more eager that they  serve more the hardliners  in 
Iran rather than the moderate forces “. A military intervention  would  only  
tarnish more the image of the West in the eyes of the  “Muslim” countries. 
The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme have  been taking many  
years , except the Nuclear Deal of  2015, there have  been  no signs  of easing 
tension between Iran  and the USA. Obviously, the US have been the driving 
force behind the  Iran policy  of the international Community, that is  why 
the  Nuclear deal is  less viable  after the American  withdrawal. More than 
the historical  diplomatic conflicts between the two  countries, the global  
strategy of the  Bush Administration to  Iran  has been to prevent its  
emergence as  a regional power. For the US  its position in general  against  
57 
Iran -except the  Obama Administration- was  a  complete  denial to have  a  
nuclear programme because always accused of  aiming to have  a  nuclear 
weapon.  And for the US, an Iran  with a  nuclear weapon  is  to  avoid  at  
any cost, even with war. 
So the political and  economic  sanctions  as well as the military pressure 
have been for the Americans the best mean right now. This  administration 
has refused to  apply the  same  strategy which is applied with  North Korea 
( based on direct bilateral talks). 
 But in the reality,  even if  Iran resent the  effect of these sanctions , it is  
not said that it is  not  able to  circumvent the universal  sanctions  by  
building bilateral  bonds with other countries  which are not  always  sharing 
the US position, especially if they  are nearest to the Russian and  Chinese 
boarder for whom the national  and  economic interest prevails more than  
an  alliance with the  USA. Moreover,  after its last  withdrawal from the 
JPCOA has  shown complete unreliability as it had turned back on its own  
commitments, giving  Iran a strong signal of mistrust which incite the latter 
to  stick to its positions and  refuse any proposition to close its enrichment 
facilities or to reduce the scope of its  nuclear program  as its  own  
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commitment to international  obligations is  not anymore a guarantee of  all 
the stakeholders’ commitment to any commonly  approved legal framework. 
In revenge, a policy of  “détente” is  more than accurate in this situation 
illustrated by : a  reinforcement of bilateral relations  and  cooperation 
between Iran    and the concerned  countries could curve the  feeling of 
threat of  Iran, its recognition  as  a regional power in the Middle-East as  well 
its right to manage enrichment capacities  for pacific  sake,  but commit to  
not make any  attempt to weaponize its nuclear programme. 
 For the  future, the European countries   as well as  Russia and  China are  
strongly sticking to the Nuclear Deal of  2015 despite the american 
injunctions  and  threats. Inside America itself, and  in the  Government , not  
all the  parties share Trump’s  view on the withdrawal concerning  Iran.   The 
Obama period  has  really been an  exception since  the Islamic revolution in  
Iran in  1979. The World has  seen through this  deal an  eventual coming out  
from the  crisis  which  could  reduce the  tensions in the  Middle- East and  
by transitivity on the  Whole World. Despite its  threats  of  sanctions,  Donald  
Trump  still  find dissidence on the  international  scene concerning its  
positions. Of  course, the US position is   very important  as  a  hegemon  and 
superpower  and  it  could  greatly influence the important  World economic  
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groups   which  are  active in  Iran  and  which  still  sustain  with this  country 
strong  relations  of  cooperation  and  business. Right now, the viability of 
the  Nuclear  Deal is  really  at risk but the  game is  not over as many 
important countries are  sticking to this  historical  agreement and  who 
knows? May be  a change in the American presidency could  be  a guaranty 
to return to the initial positions provided that the status  quo  is  maintained 
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